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Introduction 
Someone once defined “insanity” as doing the same thing over and over again, 
and expecting different results.1  The insanity of rule of law reform may not lie in 
expecting different results, but in expecting any results at all.  The idea is simple 
enough, to help developing and post-conflict countries build the rule of law: 
supporting legal, judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts, transforming the 
society into one marked by democratic lawmaking, fair and even-handed law 
enforcement and adjudication (respecting human rights), and a law-abiding 
citizenry.  But it is easier said than done, and the troubled history with this 
endeavor is no secret.  When it comes to promoting the rule of law abroad, 
notwithstanding George Santayana’s implication, it may not be enough to merely 
remember the past.2  We have been repeating it anyway, which makes the whole 
situation all the more ridiculous and painful. 
The hard part, for those working in rule of law promotion, is not just learning 
what we have done wrong, but taking it to the next level, and figuring out how to 
do it right.3  The rule of law literature has, until now, been unequal to that task, 
but Rachel Kleinfeld’s new book, Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad:  Next 
Generation Reform,4 is an impressive and emphatic response to the challenge. 
I. History of the Field 
The history of rule of law reform is as ancient as it is checkered.  Legal reform 
has, for example, always been part and parcel of colonialism and of military 
occupations, and this may be where it first surfaced.  The clash between the 
colonial power’s or occupier’s legal regime and the local, indigenous system 
inevitably created tensions, the resolution of which was often attempted by forcing 
 
1. Popularly misattributed to Albert Einstein and others, this statement may have its origin in the 
literature of Narcotics Anonymous (NA). See, e.g., NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS 23 (6th ed. 2008) 
(“Insanity is repeating the same mistakes and expecting different results”), available at 
http://www.coastalcarolinaarea.org/literature/books/b_t.pdf.  The NA Basic Text was first 
published in 1983, which appears to be the earliest occurrence of this statement. Id. at iv. 
2. 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, Reason and Common Sense, in THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905) (“Those 
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”), available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15000#download. 
3. Randy Peerenboom, The Future of Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the Field, 1 H.J.R.L. 
5, 9 (2009) (“It is now time to shift the focus from prescription of content to process and 
methodology: from the what of reform to the how.”) (emphasis in original).  
4. RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: NEXT GENERATION REFORM 33 
(2012). 
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certain changes in the indigenous system to reflect the legal traditions of the 
occupying force.5  
Today, a physical occupation is not necessary for tensions to arise.  In an 
increasingly globalized world, the legal regime of another country matters to a 
wide range of neighbors and trading partners.  Issues of security, human rights, 
environmental protection, product safety, health standards, and working 
conditions can easily spill over into other countries.  Attempts at reform—
particularly in developing and post-conflict societies—have come from a startling 
variety of motivations over the centuries as well.  Victors have done legal reform as 
a part of post-war reconstruction to “help” the vanquished nations, but certainly 
pressured them to adopt legal reforms favorable to the interests of the victor.6  
Colonial powers intent upon exploiting the resources of their respective colonies 
needed a certain degree of legal protection for their investment, and 
understandably could not trust indigenous legal institutions to protect their 
interests.  Much of the rhetoric at the time, about civilizing the savages (la mission 
civilisatrice7), purported to be benign, even though such rationalizations are 
cringe-worthy by today’s standards. 
 
5. See, e.g., Laurence Juma, Reconciling African Customary Law and Human Rights in Kenya: 
Making a Case for Institutional Reformation and Revitalization of Customary Adjudication 
Processes, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 459, 477-78  (2001-2002). See also David Pimentel, Legal 
Pluralism in Post-colonial Africa: Linking Statutory and Customary Adjudication in Mozambique, 
14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 59, 73 (2011) (“The British colonists, for example, took an 
approach to legal pluralism that assumed the validity of local customary law and the authority of 
traditional leaders to administer it. To avoid offensive outcomes under the traditional regime, 
however, they relied on ‘repugnancy clauses,’ which allowed a British Magistrate's court to 
overrule customary laws or the local authorities' judgments if they were ‘repugnant to justice and 
morality.’” (citing Juma, supra note 5, at 477-78)). There are examples as well, depicted in the 
New Testament, where Roman law superseded Hebrew law during the Roman occupation. See, 
e.g., id. at 67 n.33. 
6. Speaking of the occupation of Japan after World War II, political scientist Robert Ward described 
it as “[an] occupation [that] ‘was perhaps the single most exhaustively planned operation of 
massive and externally directed political change in world history.’” DAVID P. CAVALERI, EASIER 
SAID THAN DONE: MAKING THE TRANSITION BETWEEN COMBAT OPERATIONS AND STABILITY 
OPERATIONS 74 (Global War on Terror Occasional Paper 7, Combat Studies Institute Press 2005), 
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=vdwoPbtm24UC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA74#v= onepage 
&q&f=false. As for the purposes of the reforms, the U.S. Army Field Manual specifies the aim of 
these so-called “stability operations: ‘To deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, strengthen 
democratic processes, retain US influence or access abroad, assist US civil authorities, and 
support legal and moral imperatives,’” making clear that such legal reform activities are to be 
carried out, by the U.S. military at least, in a manner that serves U.S. interests. Id. at 10 & 17 
n.21 (quoting US Army Field Manual 3-07) (emphasis added). 
7. French statesman Jules Ferry defended colonialism as “a right [for the superior races,] because 
they have a duty. They have the duty to civilize the inferior races.” Jules François Camille Ferry, 
Speech Before the French Chamber of Deputies (Mar. 28, 1884), in DISCOURS ET OPINIONS DE 
JULES FERRY 199-201, 210-11, 215-18 (Ruth Kleinman trans., Paul Robiquet ed., Paris: Armand 
Colin & Cie., 1897), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/ 1884ferry.asp.  
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In the 1960s, the Law and Development Movement emerged, attempting to help 
developing nations, including the newly independent African states, create legal 
frameworks that would foster economic development in the region.8  Not 
surprisingly, the assistance effort contemplated helping these countries adopt 
laws, structures, and institutions that mirror those of the donor nation (in this 
case, the United States).9  The Movement, unable to answer its critics, foundered 
after a few short years10—indeed, it smacked of the very type of colonialism the 
African states had just succeeded in shrugging off.11 
After the demise of the Law and Development Movement, the 1970s and the 
1980s were quieter decades on these issues.12  But the collapse of communism 
brought the concept back with a vengeance.  Western lawyers flooded into Central 
and Eastern Europe, helping to draft new Western-style constitutions and laws 
conducive to market economies, in what was again characterized as benign 
assistance.13   
At the same time, rule of law reform became a key element of post-conflict 
rebuilding efforts in a variety of countries recovering from genocide, armed conflict, 
and/or widespread human rights abuses.  Western money and expertise flowed 
freely into places like Haiti, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Bosnia.  And a significant 
portion of the foreign aid came with strings attached, notably some very specific 
expectations for legal reform. 
This type of assistance, much of it designed to help ease security concerns by 
stabilizing the region as well as to provide humanitarian relief, was complemented 
by efforts to establish the rule of law as a precondition for economic development.14  
 
8. Law and Development Movement, Law and Justice Institutions, THE WORLD BANK (2005), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:23
103515~menuPK:1989584~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:1974062,00.html (last 
updated June 26, 2007). 
9. Kevin E. Davis & Mariana Mota Prado, Law, Regulation, and Development, in INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS, EXPERIENCE, AND PROSPECTS 206 (Bruce Currie-Alder et al. eds., 2014), 
available at http://iilj.org/courses/ documents/KevinDavisandMarianaPrado.pdf. 
10. “The law and development movement did not endure, and shortly after its inauguration it was 
declared dead by two of its key figures, David Trubek and Marc Galanter.” Id. (citing David M. 
Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974)). 
11. Id. (referencing “ethnocentrism”). 
12. David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE 
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74, 80-81(David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006), available at https://media.law.wisc.edu/m/mg3md/ruleoflaw.pdf. 
13. Id. at 84 (“[A] new set of development policy prescriptions emerged from the Washington-based 
international financial institutions.  This approach stressed export-led growth, free markets, 
privatization, and foreign investment as the keys to growth. To pursue these goals, it was 
necessary to create all the institutions of a market economy in former command economies . . . .”). 
14. Economics and the rule of law: Order in the jungle, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2008), 
http://www.economist. com/node/10849115; Moisés Naim, Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: 
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Hernando De Soto established that opportunity and prosperity could not be 
promoted without certain legal guarantees, including protection of property rights 
and a market unburdened by inefficient and corrupt government regulation.15  
Only by providing the poor entrepreneur access to justice and to the legitimate 
(rather than the extra-legal) economy, he argued, could investment and growth 
occur.16 
II. The Literature in the Rule of Law Field 
The resurgence of rule of law reform did not, however, carry with it any new 
understanding of how to do it, or whether any such assistance efforts were 
effective.  De Soto was influential in spurring interest in legal reform, but not in 
mapping its course.  Accordingly, critics began to emerge.  Tom Carothers, Wade 
Channell, Frank Upham, and others effectively exposed the faulty assumptions, 
the flawed methodology, and the illusory impact of such reform efforts.17  
Carothers’s incisive essay The Problem of Knowledge lamented the fact that we 
actually don’t know what works and what doesn’t, a theme echoed throughout the 
devastating volume he edited in 2006, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In 
Search of Knowledge,18 which featured the best literature on the rule of law since 
De Soto. 
Unfortunately, none of these critics had much to offer in terms of a constructive 
alternative to the conventional approach,19 which Frank Upham referred to as the 
“rule of law orthodoxy.”20  Veronica Taylor lamented in 2009 that “[d]espite a 
voluminous ‘lessons learned’ literature, there is much that we do not understand 
about rule of law assistance.”21  Common to much of this literature was the 
observation that the rule of law reform effort worldwide had little to show for the 
billions spent on it.  More helpful was the work of these critics, whose diagnosis 
 
Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion? (Oct. 26, 1999) (unpublished working paper) 
(on file with IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms, Washington, D.C.), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/Naim.HTM.  
15. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD 
WORLD (June Abbott trans., 1989). 
16. Id. 
17. See generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD:  IN SEARCH OF 
KNOWLEDGE (2006). 
18. Id. 
19. Kleinfeld labels this conventional approach “first generation reform.” KLEINFELD, supra note 4, at 
33. See infra notes 35-38 for further discussion. 
20. Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, 
Democracy and Rule of Law Project Working Paper No. 30, Sept. 2002), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf. 
21. Veronica Taylor, Frequently Asked Questions About Rule of Law Assistance (And Why Better 
Answers Matter), 1 H.J.R.L. 46, 46 (2009). 
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and analysis helped us understand why the efforts have been so ineffective.  
Obviously, a corrupt system full of corrupt people is not reformed with a new set of 
laws on the books, or with improved infrastructure, training, or resources.  It is 
short work for the entrenched elites to corrupt and exploit the new system much as 
they did the old. For these reasons, the traditional focus on technical assistance to 
legal institutions—what Kleinfeld calls the “top down” approach—was failing to 
achieve meaningful reform. 
The new critics noted that nothing short of “cultural” change would really 
transform a society in favor of the rule of law, but few had much to offer on how an 
outsider, a foreign donor, could effect that type of change.  As Randy Peerenboom 
put it, also in 2009, “[i]t is now time to shift the focus from prescription of content 
to process and methodology: from the what of reform to the how.”22   
While most authors were talking about what not to do, Stephen Golub was on a 
different track altogether, pressing his “legal empowerment alternative” to 
traditional rule of law reform.23  He argued that true reform, meaningful change, 
had to come from within the society, so reformers should focus on the “demand” 
side of justice, rather than the “supply” side.24  By working with the 
disenfranchised, helping them assert themselves to demand a responsive, non-
corrupt government and justice system, Golub argued, the fundamental 
underpinnings of the system would be altered, and elites could not revert to their 
corrupt and exploitative behaviors with impunity.25  If civil society is empowered to 
hold them accountable politically, then sustainable reform may be possible.26 
Golub’s work was a compelling contribution, and warranted a place in 
Carothers’s book, but it was not particularly helpful to rule of law practitioners in 
the field at the time.  We were implementing old-school reform projects, reforming 
laws and legal institutions in cooperation with government ministries—what we 
were asked, funded, and expected to do.  Golub was like a voice in the wilderness.  
His ideas were so far afield of the prevailing approach that there was no way to 
incorporate them into contemporary thinking about rule of law promotion, or into 
 
22. Peerenboom, supra note 3, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
23. Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative (Carnegie 
Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project Working Paper No. 41, Oct. 2003), 
available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf. Amartya Sen is also identified as a 
pioneer in the field of legal empowerment, although Sen is an economist and more interested in 
economic development than in justice reform per se. See LINN A. HAMMERGREN, JUSTICE REFORM 
AND DEVELOPMENT: RETHINKING DONOR ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION 
COUNTRIES 190 (2014).   
24. See generally Golub, supra note 23. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
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the projects underway in the field.27 
The next compelling contribution to the rule of law literature came from the 
academic community with the publication of Can Might Make Rights? Building the 
Rule of Law After Military Interventions by law professors Jane Stromseth, David 
Wippman, and Rosa Brooks.28 While specifically focused on the problems of 
societies that have been the subject of international military action—Iraq and 
Afghanistan being prominent examples at the time, but including Kosovo, Timor-
Leste, Bosnia, Haiti, and others—Stromseth and her co-authors’ book quickly filled 
a void for rule of law practitioners everywhere.  It addressed the problem of 
cultural imperialism and detailed the failures, the problems, and the 
contradictions inherent in rule of law promotion efforts around the world, drawing 
upon and citing the existing literature.29 
Stromseth and her co-authors, then, provided some recommendations for how to 
conduct rule of law initiatives in the future, learning from past mistakes.  It was a 
valiant effort, and they set forth some useful concepts.  But the primary lessons 
were, as Geoffrey Swenson observed, not particularly practical.30  Moreover, 
Stromseth and her co-authors’ book similarly failed to find a place for Stephen 
Golub’s innovative thinking.  The authors cited Golub, but given the radically 
different approach to the problem that Golub was proposing, his ideas could not be 
integrated into the rest of the analysis, and were mentioned almost as an 
afterthought.31 
III. Kleinfeld’s Contribution to This Literature 
Some other publications came out in the years following, including an 
impressive succession of articles in the Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (a new 
 
27. I remember reading Golub when I was doing rule of law work in the field. I was impressed with 
his ideas, but could find no way to implement them. I had my objectives and deliverables defined 
for me by those funding my projects, and they were all conceived in terms of first generation, “top 
down” reform.  
28. JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY 
INTERVENTIONS (2006). 
29. See generally id. 
30. Geoffrey Swenson, Book Notes, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 201, 217-18 (2007) (“The authors’ attempt to 
offer practical advice on actually promoting the rule of law in post-conflict societies proves less 
satisfying . . . . The ‘synergistic approach’ seems ideal on paper, but it seems unlikely to offer 
much practical guidance in real world settings . . . .”) (commenting on STROMSETH ET AL., supra 
note 28)). 
31. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 28, at 314 (quoting Golub’s statement that rule of law practitioners 
“need to think less like lawyers and more like agents of social change” (citing Golub, supra note 
23, at 3)). 
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publication that quickly established itself as the leading journal in the field),32 but 
no treatise of any significance33 until Rachel Kleinfeld turned her attention back to 
this problem in 2012 with Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation 
Reform.  Kleinfeld’s 2005 article Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: 
Implications for Practitioners34 had already assumed an important place in the 
literature,35 so this new effort, a far more comprehensive treatment of the field, 
was eagerly anticipated. 
The result is a compelling and trenchant rethinking of goals and methods of rule 
of law reform into a new theory of the field.  She harmonizes the popular 
criticisms, placing them in context.  And unlike any of her predecessors in the field, 
Kleinfeld develops the theory into a multi-faceted, complete, and coherent 
approach to the problem.  She even incorporates, as a part of her larger vision for 
the field, Stephen Golub’s legal empowerment alternative.36 
The result is remarkable in its clarity and usefulness, not merely for reconciling 
the frustrating literature (or the literature of frustration) in the rule of law field, 
but in giving meaningful guidance to policymakers, planners, and practitioners in 
the real world.  
 
32. For example, Volume One of the Hague Journal on the Rule of Law features thoughtful and 
probing articles by Randy Peerenboom, Veronica Taylor, Stephen Golub, and many others. See 
Peerenboom, supra note 3; Taylor, supra note 21; Stephen Golub, Make Justice the Organizing 
Principle of the Rule of Law Field, 1 H.J.R.L. 61 (2009). Volume Three includes some excellent 
work on the problems and issues associated with Legal Pluralism, e.g., inter alia, Julio Faundez, 
Legal Pluralism and International Development Agencies: State Building or Legal Reform?, 3 
H.J.R.L. 18 (2011), and on measurement of rule of law, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring 
the Rule of Law, 3 H.J.R.L. 269 (2011) and Linn Hammergren, Indices, Indicators and Statistics: 
A View from the Project Side as to Their Utility and Pitfalls, 3 H.J.R.L. 305 (2011). 
33. The anticipated volume MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM 
AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS (2008) was a bit of a 
disappointment. There was nothing objectionable in its content, and it contained some good 
observations and insights, but it proved to be a difficult reading, and far too theoretical to be 
useful to the practitioner. I, and the other professors teaching Rule of Law Seminars that I 
consulted, decided to keep using STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 28, as our basic text, as it 
continued to be the most accessible, practical, and useful work for rule of law practitioners. I 
continue to use Stromseth’s book, but in conjunction with Kleinfeld’s, as I consider the latter, for 
reasons set forth in this book review, to be absolutely essential reading now for anyone in the 
field.    
34. Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners 
(Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Paper No. 55, 
Jan. 2005), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP55.Belton.FINAL.pdf. 
35. Tom Carothers had included that article in his collection, and it is widely cited elsewhere in the 
literature. CAROTHERS, supra note 17, at 31-73 (article included in chapter 3). See, e.g., 
STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 28, at 73-74 n.50 & 181-82; Norman L. Greene, Perspectives from 
the Rule of Law and International Economic Development: Are There Lessons for the Reform of 
Judicial Selection in the United States?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 53, passim (2008-2009). 
36. Kleinfeld discusses Golub’s ideas in her treatment of “bottom up” reform. KLEINFELD, supra note 
4, at 119-120. 
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A. Why Do We Do It? 
Kleinfeld begins with the inevitable question of “why do we even try?” But, of 
course, the U.S. cannot help itself—it has always turned to this type of 
international aid to pursue its objectives, whether they are issues of national 
security, economic development, or human rights.37  And because everything the 
U.S. does in any of these areas affects the countries around it, the question is not 
whether the U.S. will have an impact, but “whether to be conscious and deliberate 
about the kind of impact it has.”38  
Echoing the criticisms of Carothers and others from his 2006 book,39 as well as 
her own earlier piece on “ends-based” rule of law reform,40 Kleinfeld condemns the 
historical emphasis on institutions.  Consigning this approach to yesteryear, she 
labels these efforts, which emphasized working with existing governments to 
reform the structure and operation of their legal institutions, as “First Generation” 
reform.  She then charts out the new approach, the “Second Generation” or “Next 
Generation” of rule of law reform. 
B. Defining the Rule of Law 
Most writers in this field grapple with the problem of defining “rule of law” and 
assume a sort of agnosticism, conceding the lack of consensus over what it does or 
should mean.41  Kleinfeld, in contrast, had already weighed in on the issue of 
competing definitions almost a decade ago;42 she concluded that rule of law should 
be defined in terms of “ends” and articulates five or six separate ends—some of 
them potentially contradictory43—that may be pursued under the rule of law 
banner.44  From this ends-based perspective, she concludes that rule of law is not 
 
37. Id. at 6. 
38. Id. 
39. See generally CAROTHERS, supra note 17. 
40. Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners, supra note 34. 
41. See Trebilcock and Daniels’ discussion of “thin” and “thick” theories, TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, 
supra note 33, at 41-42, and Stromseth’s unwieldy definition that perhaps tries too hard to 
include everything, STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 28, at 78-80. 
42. Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners, supra note 34. 
43. For example, “Law and Order” may be one end, sought by those pursuing rule of law reform, 
while “Human Rights” may be another objective; but Law and Order usually comes by 
empowering police, at the expense of Human Rights. Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule 
of Law: Implications for Practitioners, supra note 34, at 24-25. 
44. Kleinfeld’s original paper identified five ends, but when she reprised these ideas in her book, she 
had altered them slightly to come up with six. Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: 
Implications for Practitioners, supra note 34, at 3 (identifying these five: (1) a government bound 
by law, (2) equality before the law, (3) law and order, (4) predictable and efficient rulings, and (5) 
human rights); KLEINFELD, supra note 4, at 14-15 (identifying these six: (1) government bound by 
law, (2) equality before the law, (3) judicial and government decisions are regularized, (4) access to 
justice, (5) human rights, and (6) law and order). 
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about institutions at all, but about the relationship between the state and society.  
“Power and culture, not laws and institutions, form the roots of a rule-of-law state.  
That is the fundamental insight of second-generation rule of law reformers.”45 
C. Objects for Reform 
This insight informs Kleinfeld’s proposed second-generation approach, in which 
she is explicit in identifying four objects of reform, the first two being (1) Power 
Structure and (2) Culture, to accompany the familiar stand-bys of (3) 
Institutions, and (4) Laws.  We cannot hope to effect the rule of law anywhere by 
changing only the institutions and laws; that was the fallacy of first-generation 
reformers.46 
D. Methods/Tools of Reform 
New objects require new methods, and Kleinfeld identifies four of them: (a) Top-
Down reform, the traditional first-generation tool, involving the provision of 
funding and technical assistance to rule-of-law institutions, (b) Bottom-up reform, 
involving funding and technical assistance to internal civil society organizations, 
which then can advocate for reform from within, (c) Diplomacy, which involves 
pressure from high levels to institute change, and (d) Enmeshment, a term 
Kleinfeld adopts to describe two distinct approaches, the stronger version of which 
involves membership in international organizations, and the weaker version which 
draws upon the socializing influence of exchange programs.47  
It is not entirely clear why Kleinfeld chooses to associate these last two 
approaches,—membership in international organizations and exchange 
programs—linking them under the somewhat cryptic label of “enmeshment,”48 as 
they do not, at face value, have much in common.  The rationale, it appears, is that 
both involve reaching beyond one’s own borders to engage with other countries’ 
cultural norms and rule of law expectations.  Strong enmeshment has been a 
powerful impetus for reform in the last 20 years, as countries eager to join the EU, 
or NATO, or the WTO have worked hard to qualify by taking the initiative to 
remedy rule of law deficiencies.49  Exchange programs, including education and 
 
45. KLEINFELD, supra note 4, at 15. 
46. Id. at 22. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 110.  
49. There can be little doubt that Croatia and Serbia were most strongly influenced to deal with 
impunity issues, for the accused war criminals they were harboring from international criminal 
prosecution, by their desire to satisfy requirements for EU membership. Iavor Rangelov, EU 
Conditionality and Transitional Justice in the former Yugoslavia, 2 CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. & 
POL’Y 365 (2006) (noting the effectiveness of conditionality in relation to ICTY cooperation, and 
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training programs and study tours, have been widely used to help inculcate local 
leaders (judges, academics, and the next generation of leaders) with vision and 
values for the rule of law, although the impact of such programs is less clear.50 
Kleinfeld is unsparing in her criticism of each of these four tools for reform, very 
much aware of the limitations of each.  But unlike so much of the earlier literature, 
which seems to despair of achieving desired impacts through such methods, she 
highlights the usefulness of each approach as well, if used at the right time, under 
the right circumstances, and for the right purposes.  And then she offers very 
useful rubrics for mapping rule of law problems (in terms of their political, 
institutional/legal, and cultural components), for stakeholder analysis (supporters 
and detractors of various intensity, as well as the power and resources of each), 
and for tactical approach (employing the four key tools—top-down, bottom-up, 
diplomacy, and enmeshment—to address the four key objects of reform: power 
structure, culture, institutions, and laws).   
These rubrics are laid out in a series of tables that help focus attention on each 
problem and each approach.  For example, she illustrates a taxonomy of 
approaches in the table partially reproduced (and partially redacted) below, 
helping identify what tactic or method may be effective for achieving different 
objects of reform.51  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lamenting that conditionality was not employed to encourage other aspects of transitional justice 
in the former Yugoslavia), available at http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/44724. This is a clear example of a 
rule of law deficiency being remedied internally, by the government in power, in response to 
“enmeshment” incentives.  
50. Kleinfeld herself notes that “the development community tends to deride this soft form of 
enmeshment,” KLEINFELD, supra note 4, at 137, and notes that these exchange programs have 
been abused, for example, by Romania which used such training opportunities as a form of 
patronage, id. at 139 (citing Jeffrey Simon, NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Prospects 
for the Next Round of Enlargement 10-11 (Woodrow Wilson Center, Paper No. 58, Nov. 2000), 
available at www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF45B.pdf). 
51. KLEINFELD, supra note 4, at 150-51. 
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TABLE 6.1 TACTICS, WITH CONCRETE ILLUSTRATIONS OF INTERVENTIONS 
OBJECTS 
FOR 
REFORM 
METHODS 
Top-Down Bottom-Up Diplomacy Enmeshment 
Laws 
Tactical 
Examples 
Foreign lawyers 
draft laws and 
provide them to 
the ministry with 
a suggestion that 
they be passed 
Tactical 
Examples 
Funding to civil 
society to 
advocate for new 
laws; referenda 
Tactical 
Examples 
Conditionality 
that requires a 
country to pass 
certain laws to 
receive aid 
Tactical 
Examples 
Forcing a country 
to pass 
intellectual 
property laws to 
join the WTO 
Institutions [redacted] 
Sponsoring poll 
on corruption in 
the judiciary to 
spur civil society 
pressure; 
training 
journalists to 
improve legal 
reporting . . . . 
[redacted] 
NATO training 
mission; U.S. 
police 
engagement 
Power 
Structure 
Strengthen 
alternative power 
structures 
(institutions of 
“horizontal 
accountability” 
such as courts, 
ombudsmen) to 
rein in 
government 
[redacted] 
Rhetoric and 
pressure for 
judicial 
independence, 
fair trials, and so 
on [redacted] 
Culture [redacted] 
Funding for 
broad popular 
education on rule 
of law, local 
groups training 
schoolchildren or 
working with 
police or judges 
[redacted] 
Cultural 
exchange 
programs 
 
Elsewhere in the book, Kleinfeld offers matrices and rubrics breaking down the 
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four methods of rule of law reform,52 mapping a particular rule of law problem 
(identifying its political components, its institutional/legal components, and its 
cultural component),53 and stakeholder analysis.54  All of these are useful in 
prompting the rule of law practitioner to reach beyond the obvious, first-generation 
approaches to consider what the particular object of reform may be in each case, 
what methods may be best suited to it, and how stakeholder influence can be 
leveraged to accomplish it. 
IV. Criticisms and Weaknesses 
Despite the straightforward and logical appeal of Kleinfeld’s approach, it has 
drawn some criticism from those working in the field.   
A. Unrealistically Optimistic? 
A colleague of mine, with extensive field experience in rule of law promotion, 
found Kleinfeld’s constructive optimism somewhat off-putting.  The field is so 
fraught with well-recognized minefields these days that it is difficult to imagine 
rule of law promotion efforts can or will make a significant difference.  Another 
colleague, mired in the Afghanistan situation, confided to me that there was 
tremendous burnout for rule of law practitioners there, and that their aspirations 
have been scaled back to such a degree that they speak more of the Hippocratic “do 
no harm” principle than of effecting real or meaningful reform.  It is tempting to 
label anyone who touts the potential for meaningful reform in such a place, 
through outside intervention, as either naïve or deluded.55 
My reaction to Kleinfeld’s explication of second-generation reform, however, was 
precisely the opposite.  In a field where the literature details failure after failure—
drawing conclusions that are either weak (e.g., make sure the reform efforts are 
coordinated, and that there is good communication between rule of law actors),56 or 
anecdotal (whatever you do, don’t repeat the law reform mistakes made in Kosovo, 
 
52. Id. at 112 (Table 5.1). 
53. Id. at 190-91 (Table 7.1). 
54. Id. at 196-97 (Table 7.2). 
55. Linn Hammergren, for example, doubts that bottom-up reform is a viable or realistic approach: 
Certainly the call for donors to invest more in civil society engagement as a means of 
promoting democratic or rule of law values (e.g. Kleinfeld 2012) seems unrealistic . . 
. . While sometimes portrayed as a faster, less expensive way for donors to advance 
their projects, it is unlikely to be either.  Moreover, recent experience suggests many 
countries will not welcome it.  
HAMMERGREN, supra note 23, at 196. 
56. CAROTHERS, supra note 17, at 25. 
13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 467 (2015) 
480 
or the police reform mistakes made in Haiti)57—Kleinfeld’s approach is a welcome 
injection of constructive ideas.  She, with this next generation reform, translates 
the lessons learned (or, to a troubling degree, not learned)58 into a comprehensive 
scheme for diagnosing problems and their causes, and for then prescribing a 
carefully crafted, multi-faceted strategy that is unique to each situation.  
Depending on the problems that have been identified, the resources already in 
place, the political forces at play, and the outcomes desired, the rule of law 
strategies for two different countries may be radically different from one another.  
And, the differences are not the result of different philosophies of reform, but they 
rather flow logically from a comprehensive assessment of the situation and the full 
range of options.  The result is an approach that explicitly accounts for the 
differences, the sensitivities, and the windows of opportunity that may exist in any 
given society at any given time. 
B. Unfairly Critical? 
Another colleague, a veteran of rule of law projects in difficult places, objected to 
how harsh Kleinfeld is in her judgments of rule of law practitioners.  The book’s 
sweeping dismissal of first-generation reform as misguided and ineffective 
certainly ruffled some feathers—those of the well-intentioned and hard-working 
rule of law reformers who have fought those tough battles against daunting 
challenges.  The perception is, perhaps, that Kleinfeld has not spent enough time 
working in the field grappling with these realities, and therefore hasn’t earned the 
right to criticize those who bear the scars of the first-generation work, those who 
have been doing all the heavy lifting in this field. 
In a way, this is the flip side of the first criticism.  If she is too optimistic about 
the future, she may also be too pessimistic about the past.  To be fair, however, the 
criticisms of the past are not primarily hers.  As discussed above, the literature is 
replete with discussions of the problems with first-generation reform, and many of 
those critics, e.g., Wade Channell, are veterans from the trenches.  Again, 
Kleinfeld’s contribution is not the documentation of past failures—that’s been 
done—but rather her response to “where do we go from here?” 
 
57. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 28, at 316-22 (Kosovo) & 214-16 (Haiti). Both are examples of 
what not to do, yet lack a coherent, useful path forward. 
58. See Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned: Problems with Western Aid for Law Reform in 
Postcommunist Countries (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law 
Project, Carnegie Paper No. 57, May 2005), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files 
/CP57.Channell.FINAL.pdf.  
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C. Tone and Target Audience 
Some would argue that Kleinfeld’s work is not sufficiently scholarly to be the 
ultimate treatise on the subject.  Indeed, it has not generated the kind of attention 
in legal academia that one would expect, perhaps because Kleinfeld is neither a 
lawyer nor an academic.59  But that criticism mischaracterizes her purpose and her 
intended audience.  This is a book aimed not so much at the academic community, 
but at policymakers and practitioners who are active in the field.  It is extremely 
accessible, laying out her ideas simply and tersely in readable prose, 
understandable to virtually anyone working in the field—even those who are not 
legally trained or otherwise steeped in the political science or development 
literature.  Indeed, the book is all the more useful because of its readability for 
non-native English speakers, which includes, notably, many of the political players 
and rule of law promoters in the countries targeted for reform.60 
D. The Problem of Metrics 
One of the major strengths of Kleinfeld’s work is also a weakness.  Her 
insistence on focusing on “ends” or “impacts” rather than “outputs” or “outcomes” 
keeps the focus of the rule of law discussion where it should be.61  Otherwise, it is 
very easy to get distracted by only marginally meaningful measures of success that 
ultimately drive funding and project management decisions in the field.62  It is 
 
59. Until now, only one brief review of Kleinfeld’s book has emerged in the law journals, four and a 
half pages of the Yale Journal of International Law. Jasmeet K. Ahuja, Book Review, 38 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 253, 264-68 (2013) (review of Kleinfeld’s Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next 
Generation Reform). Contrast that with Stromseth et al.’s book from 2006—authored by three law 
professors—which commanded the attention of the American Journal of International Law, the 
Stanford Journal of International Law, the Harvard International Review, and the International 
Journal on World Peace. Cao Lan, Book Reviews: Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of 
Law After Military Interventions, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 901-07 (2007); Swenson, supra note 30; 
Douglas Rutzen, Rebuilding Justice, 29 HARV. INT’L REV. 74 (2007); Elizabeth F. Thompson, Book 
Reviews: Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions, 25 INT’L 
J. WORLD PEACE 124 (2008). 
60. In my years at Ohio Northern University, many of my students—who came primarily from the 
developing and post-conflict world to study rule of law principles and practice—struggled through 
traditional legal texts. We had used PER BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
AGENDA  (2006) as a text for the Rule of Law Seminar, but for all its good content, the students 
found it very difficult to get through. Kleinfeld’s book is far more accessible and therefore all the 
more effective for engaging students in the subject matter.  
61. KLEINFELD, supra note 4, at 199-201. 
62. Trebilcock and Daniels criticize Kleinfeld’s “ends-based” perspective, saying that it “conduces to 
largely sterile debates over normative abstractions, detached from their institutional 
instantiations, which, at the end of the day, is what is likely to matter most to a country’s 
citizens.” TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 33, at 42. I would agree that the abstraction 
inherent in Kleinfeld’s approach is a weakness, but not because these abstract concepts don’t 
matter to the country’s citizens—the general sense of unequal treatment before the law is 
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easy to count how many people have received certain training, how many laws 
have been passed, or how many public information forums have been held.  
Funding agreements are likely to measure success in terms of these deliverables, 
rather than the more meaningful, but harder to quantify impacts on society as a 
whole, in solving the underlying problem.63  Her suggestion that “[t]rained 
measurement professionals should be able to create well-conceived metrics to 
address these gaps” rings a little hollow, given that the trained measurement 
professionals have played a large role in creating these gaps.64 
Moreover, the “ends-based” reform approach that Kleinfeld advocates is 
implementable only to the degree that the funders are willing to define the projects 
in such terms.  As long as funding agencies feel bound to operate in terms of 
measurable outputs, Kleinfeld’s ideas cannot change the behavior or the focus of 
the rule of law practitioner.  Her arguments will certainly resonate with those in 
the trenches, but as long as the money is tied to concrete, defined, and measured 
deliverables, the practitioners will—out of practical necessity and self-
preservation—focus on producing precisely that.65 
Kleinfeld would undoubtedly agree, and would note that her intended audience 
with such criticisms is the donor community itself.  But funders may have their 
hands tied; they may be beholden to political forces or bureaucratic requirements 
that they have something to “show” for all the money spent.  So although Kleinfeld 
makes a compelling argument, this problem may not be so easily solved as she 
implies. 
That said, Kleinfeld’s failure to solve this intractable problem should not detract 
from the range of problems she does address more meaningfully in her book.  The 
 
enormously important to citizens—but simply because they cannot be effectively measured; one 
cannot tell when they have been satisfactorily achieved. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989) (noting the depth of human feeling about 
unequal treatment: “Parents know that children will accept quite readily all sorts of arbitrary 
substantive dispositions—no television in the afternoon, or no television in the evening, or even no 
television at all. But try to let one brother or sister watch television when the others do not, and 
you will feel the fury of the fundamental sense of justice unleashed.”). 
63. See Scalia, supra note 62. 
64. KLEINFELD, supra note 4, at 202. I once sat in an all-day seminar for all USAID contractors in 
Romania, dedicated to the proposition that we had to make sure everything we did on our USAID 
contracts was measurable. The suggestion was that if it couldn’t be measured, it wasn’t worth 
doing. It was a very frustrating day, particularly as my project was aimed at, among other things, 
improving the ethical sensitivity of Romanian judges, through training and awareness 
enhancement. In fairness, this was more than 10 years ago, so perhaps that emphasis has scaled 
back in the meantime. 
65. Channell argues that this starts at the request for proposal stage by the funding agencies because 
“they are seeking ‘correct’ answers that meet their expectation,” instead of incentivizing 
innovation. Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned about Legal Reform, in CAROTHERS, supra note 
17, at 151-53. 
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book is so good on so many issues that it fosters expectations that it should be 
competent to resolve them all; this solution, alas, still eludes us. 
E. Focus on Political Forces and Culture 
After arguing that altering power structure and social norms will often be far 
more important in establishing the rule of law than reforming institutions and 
laws, Kleinfeld emphasizes the importance of a stakeholder analysis, identifying 
winners and losers, as well as supporters and spoilers of the desired reforms.66  
Only by pursuing this analysis can tactics be developed that will leverage the 
political and cultural forces in favor of reform.67  But breaking down the cultural 
and political landscape may be a task that lawyers—the typical players in rule of 
law projects—are ill-equipped to perform, she argues, and that therefore “requires 
adding anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists” to the projects.68  
Indeed, it appears obvious that if culture is the object of change, then the effort 
must be staffed by anthropologists, the experts on culture. 
What Kleinfeld overlooks with this suggestion is that when the aim of the 
project is to alter culture, the whole enterprise threatens to offend the ethics of 
anthropology.69  Any anthropologist who employs her training to assist in changing 
or “improving” the culture of the society she studies—particularly in projects 
funded by the U.S. government—is likely to attract the suspicion, if not the 
enmity, of the entire anthropological community.  The history of this sensitivity 
arises from the past use of anthropological expertise for military purposes:  
Where the pre-World War II generation of anthropologists had 
regarded their national military and intelligence services with an 
ethically neutral (or, in some cases, beneficent) eye, the following 
generations developed the suspicious and antagonistic view of 
 
66. See generally KLEINFELD, supra note 4, at 181-209 (ch. 7). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 219. See also id. at 195 (“The only way to determine which individuals and institutions 
support and oppose reform is to invest the time and money in a good stakeholder analysis, 
conduct by a knowledgeable and experienced sociologist or social scientist trained in interview 
techniques.”). 
69. It should be noted that Kleinfeld is not the first to advocate the use of anthropologists in rule of 
law reform projects. Shelly Quast, in 2004, insisted that “assessment team[s] must . . . have 
cultural, regional, and lingual expertise.” Shelly Quast, Rule of Law in Post-conflict Societies: 
What is the Role of the International Community?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 45, 48 (2004-2005). Jane 
Stromseth et al. emphasized the role of “[a]nthropologists and country experts” in strategic 
assessments.  STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 28, at 189. Jane Stromseth repeated the argument in 
2009: “Interveners also often do not have a good understanding of local culture, traditions, or 
language. Often interveners will need to deploy anthropologists as well as lawyers and other 
country experts if they are genuinely trying to tackle the deeper problems of building the rule of 
law.” Jane Stromseth, Strengthening Demand for the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 18 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 415, 417 (2009). 
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Third World leaders. From this perspective, employment with 
these national agencies was a prostitution of valuable professional 
talents for monies and prestige; it was a betrayal of the peoples 
whose welfare anthropology had claimed to cherish. . . . By the 
time that the United States had become militarily involved in the 
conflict in Southeast Asia, the pendulum had thus swung far in the 
direction where "ethics" were defined as a refusal to have any 
dealings with the military side of government, or with any aspect 
of government that seemed to sustain an imperialistic 
orientation.70 
The revulsion of the anthropological community to the use of their expertise to 
serve imperialistic ends has not discouraged the military from continuing such 
efforts.71  In 2007, the Department of Defense implemented a “Human Terrain 
System” embedding Human Terrain Teams with combat units in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.72  The idea was developed by Montgomery McFate at the U.S. Naval 
War College73 in a critical and controversial paper74 and generated considerable 
blowback in the anthropological community.  “Some of the best potential 
candidates probably grew leery of the program when the American Anthropological 
Association (AAA) declared participants would most likely be violating the ethics 
tenets of their profession if they signed up.”75 
 
70. Murray L. Wax, Some Issues and Sources on Ethics in Anthropology, in 23 HANDBOOK ON ETHICAL 
ISSUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY para. 7 & 9 (Joan Cassell & Sue-Ellen Jacobs eds., 1987), available at 
http://www.aaanet.org/ committees/ethics/toc.htm. 
71. In 2005, Major O. Kent Strader of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College argued 
that “culture has the potential to be weaponized . . . [which means] employing culture as an 
instrument of attack or defense in warfare.” Kent Strader, Culture: The New Key Terrain, 
Integrating Cultural Competence into JIPB 64 (May 25, 2006) (unpublished monograph) (on file 
with the Defense Technical Information Center), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ 
ADA450632. He continues, “[t]o operationally weaponize culture, planners must discover using 
cultural competence the levers or tensions within a culture that can be manipulated.” Id. 
72. A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2008, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/gun-one-hand-pen-other-85485. 
73. Noah Shachtman, Montgomery McFate: Use Anthropology in Military Planning, WIRED MAG. 
(Sept. 22, 2008), http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/magazine/16-10/sl_mcfate. 
74. Montgomery McFate, Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious 
Relationship, 85(2) MIL. REV. 24, 37 (2005). 
75. A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other, supra note 72. The AAA later issued a letter responding 
to the Newsweek article and clarifying its position. The letter cited an AAA Board statement that 
seemed to emphasize the particular circumstances of the war in Iraq: “In the context of a war that 
is widely recognized as a denial of human rights and based on faulty intelligence and 
undemocratic principles, the Executive Board sees the [Human Terrain System] project as a 
problematic application of anthropological expertise, most specifically on ethical grounds.” AAA 
Responds to Newsweek Article on HTS, AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N (2008), 
http://www.aaanet.org/issues/AAA-Responds-to-Newsweek-article-on-HTS.cfm. The letter also 
cited a subsequent and far more moderate statement from the Board: “The Commission 
recognizes both opportunities and risk to those anthropologists choosing to engage with the work 
of the military, security and intelligence arenas. We do not recommend non-engagement, but 
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While rule of law reform is not always or necessarily a military objective, a large 
amount of the work today is being done by the military, particularly in 
Afghanistan.76  Moreover, as noted above, rule of law reform has a long and 
troubled association with imperialistic agendas.77  Accordingly, almost any project 
funded by the U.S. Government, by other Western powers, or by the international 
organizations they dominate (e.g., the EU, the World Bank, and the UN), will raise 
ethical questions for anthropologists.78  The inherently judgmental and 
condescending nature of the rule of law intervention—based on a determination 
that the culture of the target society is somehow flawed and needs to be fixed—is 
fundamentally at odds with anthropological sensibilities,79 particularly if 
anthropology is perceived from within as “the only discipline . . . consistently 
 
instead emphasize differences in kinds of engagement and accompanying ethical considerations.”  
Id. 
76. LIANA SUN WYLER & KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41484, AFGHANISTAN: U.S. 
RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE SECTOR ASSISTANCE (2010) (see Summary section identifying the 
Defense Department’s Rule of Law programs as among the four “major programs” for justice 
sector reform in Afghanistan), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41484.pdf. The Defense 
Department has now published its own Rule of Law Handbook.  THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY & CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, 
RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES (Katherine Groove et 
al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rule-of-law_2008.pdf. The 
Defense Department has “taken a very highprofile role in the development of both the Iraqi and 
Afghan legal systems.”  Thomas B. Nachbar, The U.S. Military's Role in Rule of Law 
Development: From Intervention to Security Assistance 1 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of L., Pub. L. & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Ser., Working Draft No. 2013-12, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242027. Exactly how much the U.S. military is spending on rule of law 
in Afghanistan, however, is difficult to determine. The State Department’s Inspector General 
noted in 2008, “[t]he OIG team was unable to obtain an estimate of the funds spent by DOD 
commands on ROL.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE & BROADCASTING BD. OF GOVERNORS, OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. ISP-I-08-09, REP. OF INSPECTION: RULE-OF-LAW PROGRAMS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 44 (2008), available at http://oig.state.gov/system/files /106946.pdf.  
77. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
78. The American Anthropological Association’s Principles of Professional Responsibility are, after all, 
intended for “use by anthropologists in their everyday professional lives.” Principles of 
Professional Responsibility, AAA ETHICS BLOG (Nov. 1, 2012), http://ethics.aaanet.org/ 
category/statement/. 
79. The American Anthropological Association’s Principles of Professional Responsibility, supra note 
78, revised in 2011 after considerable controversy over the idea of anthropologists working for the 
U.S. Military, is more moderate and allows some room for employment in fields that involve social 
critique and advocacy. See Scott Jaschik, Ethics Without ‘Thou Shall Not’, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/11/21/ anthropologists-consider-new-
ethics-code#sthash.aKQMiAcE.dpbs. It cautions, however, that 
[D]eterminations regarding what is in the best interests of others or what kinds of 
efforts are appropriate to increase well-being are value-laden and should reflect 
sustained discussion with others concerned. Anthropological work must similarly 
reflect deliberate and thoughtful consideration of potential unintended consequences 
and long-term impacts on individuals, communities, identities, tangible intangible 
heritage and environments. 
 Principles of Professional Responsibility, supra note 78. 
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committed to the idea of moral equality among cultures.”80  
The upshot is that it may be simply unrealistic to expect anthropologists to join 
the cause of promoting rule of law reform, or to participate in projects designed to 
change culture.  A more realistic approach may be to train rule of law reformers, 
unencumbered by anthropologists’ ethical scruples, in ethnography.  
Conclusion 
Perhaps, despite the sensitivities urged by Kleinfeld and other recent writers on 
the subject, rule of law reform can never completely shake the label of “cultural 
imperialism,” precisely because it presupposes that a society and culture that lacks 
the rule of law requires change and reform.  But rule of law reform need not cede 
the moral high ground.  It is dedicated to making the world a better place, and that 
necessarily involves that judgments be made—that human rights abuses, 
corruption, invidious discrimination, impunity, and a range of other societal evils 
be condemned and ultimately eradicated.  
The effort to achieve those ends, particularly through outside influence, 
however, has proven to be a nettlesome task, and hopes for success in the field 
have faded substantially in the last decade.  To argue that Kleinfeld’s book resolves 
all issues in rule of law reform would be irresponsible.  There are many more 
problems to be solved and tactics to be questioned.  However, Kleinfeld’s book 
provides novel insight that can propel rule of law reform into a new age of growth, 
or at least of relevance.  Notably, she has made the case for the continued value 
and vitality of the enterprise, and she charts a course that is far better informed, 
far more sensitive to cultural and political forces, and far more savvy about using 
this understanding to bolster prospects for success.  
Rule of law reform might have gone the way of the Law and Development 
Movement, retired after an inauspicious series of misadventures in the post-
conflict and developing world.  First generation reform was hurtling madly down 
that track, investing heavily in reform efforts of dubious effectiveness, some of it 
with track records of futility or worse, but nonetheless hoping for better results 
this time around.  Kleinfeld is now bringing method to this madness.  Her second 
generation rule of law reform, drawing on critiques by a variety of scholars over 
the past ten years and now consolidated into a clear, cogent, and comprehensive 
approach, will not just revolutionize the field.  It may well save it altogether. 
 
 
80. Ken Gewertz, Anthropology professor wins ASA's Melville J. Herskovits Prize, HARVARD GAZETTE 
(Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/12.07/13-herkovits.html (quoting 
Harvard Anthropology Professor J. Lorand Motory). 
